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Fragile watermarking has attracted a lot of attention in the last decade. An interesting approach has been presented in 2011 by 
Lin et al. which results in very high quality of the watermarked images. However, after a thorough examination of the paper, a 
few improvements are proposed in our revised version of the algorithm in order to overcome some shortcomings. In particular, 
changes to the pseudo-code and modifications to deal with pixel saturation are suggested, along with a way to improve the 
scheme security. Finally, a deeper analysis of the security is presented. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Digital watermarking is a set of techniques aimed at inserting a signal, called watermark, into a 
digital object. In particular, fragile watermarks have the objective to be modified by a minimal 
alteration made to the host object. In this context, they may be used for content integrity and 
authentication. A very interesting algorithm for the fragile watermarking of images has been recently 
presented in [Lin et al. 2011], that results in high quality images. Nonetheless, in our analysis of that 
algorithm, we found some shortcomings that need to be solved in order to use their efficient technique. 
In this paper, we consider these issues and suggest how they can be dealt with by proposing an 
improved version of Lin et al.’s algorithm. 
2. THE LIN ET AL. WATERMARKING SCHEME IMPROVEMENTS 
Lin et al. [2011] presented an algorithm (referred to in the following as LLC) for the detection of 
image alterations; the algorithm inserts a fragile watermark with the intent that a modification of the 
image will change some parts of the watermark allowing for the localization of the tampering. The 
claimed advantage of the method is that only one pixel per block needs to be eventually modified by ±1 
gray levels, thus producing high quality images. 
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One problem of LLC lies in the pseudo-code: indeed, the while loop in line 9 never terminates when f 
is different from the intended watermark (l1 , l2 , . . ., ln+1)2, as the value of f is not recomputed inside 
the loop, so the test condition never changes its truth value. 
A more subtle problem of LLC is related to the modifications of the pixels. What happens when the 
pixel to be modified already has a value at the extreme of the allowed interval? For instance, let us 
suppose that the pixel to modify by ‒1 has value 0. The result (‒1) is clearly out of the allowed range 
for a pixel. How the LLC algorithm deals with this case should be made explicit in order for the 
algorithm to be applicable to a wider range of images. There are two possible alternatives. 
The first one is to use modulo arithmetic when changing the pixel value: so ݌|ௗ| ± 1 should actually be 
൫݌|ௗ| ± 1൯ mod (MAX+1), where MAX is the maximum allowed value for a pixel. If this is the case, then 
the claim that the proposed method changes at most one pixel by ±1 per block should be revised. 
Moreover, the quality of the watermarked image can be affected in an unacceptable way: if the pixel 
value changes from 0 to 255 due to modulo arithmetic, this results in a visibly distorted pixel (salt & 
pepper noise). But even though the change were not visible, the PSNR of the resulting image would be 
about half of that expected. To make it simple, let us choose a value n so that we have only 1 block 
(e.g., for a 512×512 pixel image, n=18). According to Lin et al.’s claim, only one pixel at most would be 
changed by ±1, resulting in a PSNR > 102 dB. But if the pixel is changed by 255, then the resulting 
PSNR is only 54.18 dB, almost half of that theoretically expected. This is never the case for the test 
image (Lena) used by Lin et al., so this problem was not revealed. 
ALGORITHM RLLC: The revised fragile watermarking procedure 
Input: the protected image O, authentication data, parameter n, and a user key UK 
Output: the watermarked image O’ 
1. divide O into non-overlapping blocks each containing 2n pixels 
2. set all blocks as unprocessed 
3. select an unprocessed block, called B, and set B as a processed block 
3.5 permute the pixels of B according to B’s position in O and to UK, and produce Bp 
4-6. generate watermark bits L = [l1 , l2 , . . ., ln+1] according to B’s position in O and to UK 
7. let p1 , p2 , . . ., and p2n be the pixels of the block Bp 
7.5 repeat 
8. calculate the weighted-sum function ݂	 = ൫∑ ݉	 ×	݌௠ଶ೙௠ୀଵ ൯mod	2௡ାଵ 
9. if f ≠ (l1 , l2 , . . ., ln+1)2 
  d = (l1 , l2 , . . ., ln+1)2 ‒ f 
  if (0 < |d| ≤ 2n) 
   ൜࢖|ࢊ| + ૚,		if	(ࢊ > 0	and			࢖|ࢊ| < MAX)	or	(ࢊ < 	0	and			࢖|ࢊ| = 0)࢖|ࢊ|‒ ૚,		if	(ࢊ < 0	and			࢖|ࢊ| > 0)	or	(ࢊ > 0	and			࢖|ࢊ| = MAX)  
  else 
   ቊ࢖૛࢔శ૚ି|ࢊ|‒૚,		if	(ࢊ > 0	and			࢖૛࢔శ૚ି|ࢊ| > 0)	or	(ࢊ < 	0	and			࢖૛࢔శ૚ି|ࢊ| = MAX)࢖૛࢔శ૚ି|ࢊ| + ૚,		if	(ࢊ < 	0	and	࢖૛࢔శ૚ି|ࢊ| < MAX)	or	(ࢊ > 0	and	࢖૛࢔శ૚ି|ࢊ| = 0)  
  end-if 
 end-if 
9.5 until f = (l1 , l2 , . . ., ln+1)2 
9.6 restore the pixels of Bp into their original positions to produce B’ and save it in O' 
10. check whether there exists any unprocessed block. If so, go to Step 3. 
11. return the watermarked image O’ 
 
The second alternative is to use saturated arithmetic, i.e. any value out of range is saturated to the 
extreme of the range. In this case, the loop in line 9 of LLC would never end, even if it were correct. A 
straightforward solution would be to select two pixels in positions j and k, such that (αj+βk) mod 2n+1 = 
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|d|, being α and β the modifications to apply to the two selected pixels (with opposite sign if d is 
negative). This solution is always feasible, but it might be computationally expensive to select 
appropriate j and k, and, moreover, α and β might be larger than ±1. 
The RLLC algorithm presents a neat solution that uses a different approach and produces high 
quality watermarked images, by allowing to change by ±1 two or more pixels (a similar approach is 
described in [Zhang and Wang 2006] but only with an example and without a formal proof of 
termination). The only issue here is that more than one pixel may be changed by one gray level, 
slightly reducing the PSNR from the values computed in [Lin et al. 2011]. 
Formally, we can prove that the RLLC algorithm always terminates by considering these two cases: 
a) if the pixel has to be increased by 1 and its value is less than MAX, or has to be decreased by 1 
and it is greater than 0, then the new pixel value will make f = (l1 , l2 , . . ., ln+1)2 as in the LLC 
algorithm, so the loop will terminate and the correct value will be stored in the block; 
b) if the pixel is equal to 0 (or to MAX) then it is increased (or decreased, respectively) by 1, 
moving its value away from the range limit (i.e. away from 0 and MAX); in the next repeat-until 
loop, if the new selected pixel satisfies case a) then the loop will terminate, otherwise also the 
new pixel will be moved away from 0 or MAX, changing once more the difference d. Then the 
loop will be repeated, but case b) cannot happen forever, because in the worst case 2n pixels will 
be moved away from the range limits, and then only case a) will apply, terminating the loop. 
In order to assess the quality of the images watermarked with our proposed revision, Table I reports 
the average values and standard deviations computed over a database of 1000 512×512 pixels images 
taken from [Li et al. 2007], comparing the theoretical properties of the approach with the real values 
obtained by Lin et al.’s algorithm (correctly implemented and using modulo arithmetic) and by our 
revised version. We focused on values of n used in practical watermarking applications. 
Table I. Comparison of the quality between LLC (with modulo arithmetic) and RLLC algorithms. (mean ± std). 
 Theoretical Values  LLC (modulo arithmetic)  RLLC  
n Max Modified pixels (by ±1) 
Theoretical 
Min  PSNR PSNR 
Actually 
Modified Pixels 
Average 
modification 
# pixels 
modified by 255 PSNR 
Actually Modified 
Pixels 
5 8192 63.18  51.93±11.83 8064.72±14.49 2.27±4.08 40.3±129.96  63.23±0.07 8107.18±142.09 
6 4096 66.19  56.28±11.24 4064.24±6.54 1.77±3.3 12.4±52.8  66.21±0.06 4078.11±59.13 
7 2048 69.2  59.55±11.55 2040.21±2.92 1.81±3.3 6.54±26.51  69.2±0.06 2047.62±29.83 
8 1024 72.21  63.4±12 1023.65±6.46 1.86±3.03 3.56±12.79  72.21±0.06 1026±15.03 
9 512 75.22  67.7±12.1 512.78±3.93 1.83±2.52 1.71±5.35  75.21±0.06 513.49±7.05 
RLLC effectively modifies pixels by at most ±1, while LLC modifies a large number of pixels by 255. 
On average, RLLC modifies a slightly larger number of pixels than LLC, but its average PSNR is 
greater than the theoretical minimum value, as expected, and it is very sharp (std is 0.06), while LLC 
is far from the theoretical value, even though for larger values of n this difference decreases. 
3. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
First of all, let us examine the security of Lin et al.’s algorithm: in their paper, they declare that 
“without the user key UK and the parameter n, the intruder is incapable of successfully manipulating 
the watermarked image and passing the verification procedure”. 
In our opinion, the method simply remaps bits to bits, without increasing the fragility of the 
watermark, which instead depends on the length of L: an attacker will not try to break either A or UK, 
but only to discover the value of L. In this case, only L is useful for the security of the method. Indeed, 
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an intruder does not need to know the user key, nor parameter n, as claimed by Lin et al. to 
successfully tamper the watermarked image (it is secure only if n=0). 
Here is an extremely simple procedure to tamper an image watermarked with LLC and pass the 
verification test. Firstly, let us consider the simpler case where the intruder actually knows 
parameter n. (S)He can therefore split the image in blocks of size 2n pixels as done by LLC. Then,	݂′	 =
൫∑ ݉	 ×	݌௠ଶ೙௠ୀଵ ൯	mod	2௡ାଵ can be computed for each block and from that the lock matrix L’ is derived. 
Now, the intruder modifies pixel pi by +2 and pixel p2i by ‒1, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n˗ 1. As can be easily verified, the 
value of f’ does not change and the watermarked image so tampered will pass the verification 
procedure. Then, let us consider the case in which the intruder does not know parameter n, but (s)he 
supposes that n>0. The intruder cannot split the watermarked image into blocks as done by the LLC 
algorithm, but this is not necessary to tamper the image: whatever the value of parameter n, the LLC 
algorithm will put into the first block the first 2 pixels of the host image that will be used in the 
computation of function f for the first block. By changing these 2 pixels in the watermarked image the 
way we described above, the value of f’ will not change, so the extracted lock matrix L’ will be the 
same as the one inserted. Again, this tampering will go undetected by the verification process. 
Finally, Lin et al. claim that the probability to successfully counterfeit a watermarked image (of H×W 
pixels) without the knowledge of UK is 1/[(݊	 + 	1)!]((ு×ௐ)/ଶ೙) when n≥1. Actually, this probability is 1, 
as the tampering procedure shown always counterfeits the watermarked image whenever the value of 
n is known. Moreover, since n is limited by the image size (n ≤ logଶ(ܪ ×ܹ)), there is a probability of 
1/n to guess the value of n, and successfully apply the tampering procedure to every block. 
One way to make the scheme more secure is to reorder the pixels that will form a block according to 
UK (step 3 of LLC): as an intruder does not know UK, he will not be able to apply the same 
permutation on the watermarked image, even when knowing parameter n. The probability to 
successfully tamper a block is now 1/[2௡(2௡ − 1)]. Step 3.5 of the RLLC algorithm permutes the pixels 
of every block of the host image according to the block position and to the user key UK, and step 9.6 
reorders the pixels of all blocks into their original positions. 
One last observation shows that LLC has a behavior typically opposite to other approaches. In fact, by 
increasing the number of bits s=n+1 inserted into a block also the probability of not detecting a 
tampered image (false negative) increases. The probability of a false negative for one single block is 
1/2s. According to LLC, for an image containing H×W pixels, the total number of blocks is b = 
(H×W)/2s˗ 1. Thus, the probability of a false negative for an image is ௙ܲ = ቀ ଵଶೞቁ
௕ = ቀ ଵଶೞቁ
ಹ×ೈ
మೞషభ . This function 
exponentially increases for increasing values of s, meaning that inserting more bits into a block 
increases the probability of not detecting a forged image. The explanation is that an increase in the 
number of bits-per-block (bpb) implies larger blocks: one more bpb implies doubling the size of the 
block, thus reducing the overall watermark size (improving the resulting image quality), and 
consequently increasing ௙ܲ. Moreover, a larger block size means a reduced localization capability of 
the forged areas, suggesting the use of small blocks. 
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